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Identity	Politics	and	the	Political	Marketplace
Contemporary	wars	tend	to	be	characterised	by	identity	politics,	that	is	to	say,	the	notion	that	cultural,	ethnic	or
religious	identity	is	inextricably	linked	to	political	identity.	The	ascendance	of	political	identity,	as	scholars	of
nationalism	remind	us,	is	associated	with	the	rise	of	the	modern	state	and	notions	of	citizenship.	But	whereas	early
modern	nationalism	or	post-colonial	nationalism	tended	to	be	broad	and	inclusive,	a	way	of	defining	the	people	in
order	to	establish	democracy,	the	identity	politics	that	represent	the	narratives	of	warring	parties	tend	to	be
exclusive,	fragmentative	and	at	the	same	time	transnational.
Avel	Chuklanov.	Source:	Unsplash.
It	was	the	anthropologist	Ernest	Gellner	who	propounded	the	link	between	nationalism	and	modernity.	According	to
Gellner,	nationalism	is	a	collective	ideology,	based	on	the	principle	that	the	cultural,	political	and	territorial	unit	is
congruent.	Gellner	contrasts	the	vertical	territorially	based	national	cultures	typical	of	modernity	with	the	more
differentiated	cultures	of	traditional	societies.	Before	the	invention	of	printing	and	the	spread	of	writing	in	vernacular
languages,	it	was	possible	to	distinguish	between	horizontal,	i.e.	non-territorial,	‘high	cultures’	generally	based	on
religion	and	a	scholarly	written	language,	e.g.	Latin,	Persian	or	Sanskrit,	and	a	variety	of	local	vertical	oral	low
cultures.1	The	emergence	of	national	cultures	is	associated	with	the	rise	of	the	modern	state,	printing	in	the
vernacular	language,	and	the	spread	of	primary	education.	One	of	the	many	local	cultures	is	elevated	through
printing	and	education	and	spread	within	a	territorial	area	bounded	by	the	state.
But	today’s	world	is	often	described	as	post-industrial.	Far-reaching	changes	have	taken	place,	often	loosely
described	as	globalisation,	that	challenge	the	congruence	between	culture,	the	political	unit	and	territory	that
underpinned	the	political	arrangements	of	modernity.	Three	broad	changes	are	relevant	for	any	analysis	of	the	type
of	identity	politics	we	can	observe	in	contemporary	war.
First	of	all,	the	rise	of	the	information-based	economy	reduces	the	importance	of	territorially	based	industrial
production.	The	global	economy	is	both	more	transnational	and	more	local.	Growing	sectors	of	the	economy	like
finance	and	research	and	development	are	increasingly	global.	At	the	same	time,	markets	are	increasingly
specialised	and	local	as	profits	are	increasingly	derived	from	catering	to	a	differentiated	market	(economies	of
scope)	rather	than	from	low	cost	mass	production	(economies	of	scale).	What	we	are	witnessing	is	a	profound
change	in	the	division	of	labour.	On	the	one	hand,	there	is	a	growing	class	of	what	Robert	Reich	calls	‘symbolic
analysts’,	people	who	work	with	abstract	symbols	in	finance,	technology,	education,	or	welfare.2	These	are	the
graduates	of	the	explosion	in	tertiary	education,	who	communicate	across	borders	and	generally	speak	a	global
language,	usually	English.	On	the	other	hand,	there	is	a	growing	underclass	of	people	who	service	the	new
symbolic	analysts,	who	work	in	the	informal	sector	and	who	trade	in	cultural	diversity	through	a	variety	of	menial
tasks.	The	classic	industrial	worker	who	formed	the	backbone	of	the	nationalist	ideology	and	was	physically
associated	with	territory	through	the	factory	system	is	increasingly	marginalised.
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Secondly,	the	shift	from	print	technology	to	electronic	communications	has	momentous	implications,	which	it	is
probably	much	too	soon	to	describe.	The	vernacular	national	print	literature	of	the	modern	period	has	been
supplanted	by	both	more	global	and	local	forms	of	visual	and	oral	representation.	Novels	have	given	way	to	film;
newspapers	are	giving	way	to	social	media.		On	the	one	hand,	as	many	analysts	of	globalisation	point	out,	Internet,
smart	phones,	satellite	television,	and	air	travel	make	possible	new	global	virtual	communities	who	speak	a	global
language,	often	English.	On	the	other	hand,	radio,	television	and	mobile	phones	reach	out	to	local	communities	that
do	not	have	the	reading	habit	and	make	possible	much	more	rapid	and	dramatic	political	mobilisation.	The	new
technologies	are	associated	with	horizontal	networks	forms	of	organisation	rather	than	the	vertical	pyramidal	type	of
organisation	typical	of	the	modern	era.	At	the	same	time	,	the	‘echo	chamber’	character	of	social	media	tends	to	be
linked	to	fragmented	(and	often	extremist)	forms	of	identity	construction.
Thirdly,	there	has	been	a	fundamental	change	in	the	nature	of	the	state.	On	the	one	hand,	the	globalisation	of	the
economy	and	communications	has	been	a	way	of	getting	around	national	rules	and	constraints	and	evading	the
dominance	of	the	state.	On	the	other	hand,	many	of	the	decisions	that	directly	affect	everyday	life	are	no	longer
taken	at	the	level	of	the	state.	The	capacity	of	the	state	to	respond	to	domestic	demands	often	depends	on	its	ability
to	negotiate	at	a	transnational	level	with	international	institutions,	multinational	companies	and	other	states.	Parts	of
society,	particularly	the	wealthy	parts,	which	Reich	describes	as	the	cosmopolitan	secessionists,	escape	the
purview	of	the	state,	while	those	that	remain	bear	a	greater	burden	of	state	control.
The	change	in	the	nature	of	the	state	can	be	analysed	through	its	changing	revenue	base.	It	was	Max	Weber	who
argued	that	political	institutions	are	shaped	by	their	economic	foundations	and	that	the	sources	of	income	shape	the
structure	and	dynamics	of	state	power.	What	we	can	observe	is	a	shift	from	direct	to	indirect	taxation	and	from	tax
to	rent.	More	and	more	states	have	become	dependent	on	income	from	borrowing,	external	assistance	or	mineral
revenues,	especially	oil.	In	contrast	to	tax	based	states	who	rely	in	some	sort	of	contract	with	the	citizens,	rentier
states	tend	to	be	characterised	by	networks	of	patronage	and,	in	the	context	of	externally	driven	rents,	networks
that	are	both	national	and	global.	The	contemporary	rentier	state	can	be	described	in	terms	of	what	the	CRP	calls
the	‘political	marketplace’	in	which	politicians	(or	patronage	networks)	compete	for	the	private	distribution	of	the
state’s	revenue	instead	of	political	competition	around	the	public	distribution	of	revenue	(the	provision	of	services
and	so	on).
Neo-liberal	economic	doctrines	have	fed	into	these	tendencies.	Economic	liberalisation	in	many	of	the	countries	that
have	experienced	contemporary	wars	has	been	associated	with	the	decline	of	value-adding	activities	such	as
manufacturing	and	agriculture,	dramatic	urbanisation	as	those	who	lose	their	traditional	forms	of	livelihood	move	to
towns,	and	increased	socio-economic	inequality.	Privatization	has	given	rise	to	oligarchic	networks	with	privileged
access	to	the	state.	These	tendencies	have	been	sped	up	since	the	2008	financial	crisis,	exacerbating	the
monetisation	of	global	and	national	political	hierarchies.
So	what	do	these	changes	imply	for	the	evolution	of	political	identity?	It	would	be	wrong	to	suggest	that	they	imply	a
return	to	something	like	the	differentiated	cultural	structures	of	the	pre-modern	period,	described	by	Gellner,
although	it	is	tempting	to	draw	such	a	conclusion.	Applying	Gellner’s	method	of	argument,	we	might	anticipate	a
transnational	high	culture,	for	example,	transmitted	through	those	engaged	in	global	communication	and	travel,
assumed	to	be	cosmopolitan	and	inclusive,	combined	with	a	myriad	of	local	largely	oral	cultures	more	likely	to	be
exclusive.	In	practice	however,	contemporary	exclusive	identities	are	often	global	and	transnational	while	the
inclusive	identities	typical	of	democracy	activists	and	civil	society	may	often	be	very	local.	Rather	what	we	are
seeing	is	the	emergence	of	both	more	fragmented	and	more	transnational	political	identities	–the	Shi’a-Sunni
schism	is	one	such	example	expressing	both	domestic	strife	and	geo-political	rivalry	between	Iran	and	Saudi
Arabia.
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These	fragmented	and	horizontal	identities,	it	can	be	argued,	fit	the	political	marketplace,	in	rather	the	same	way
that	the	vertical	national	identities	described	by	Gellner	fitted	modern	industry	and	the	modern	state.	The	patronage
networks	of	the	political	marketplace	are	often	defined	in	terms	of	identity.	Competition	among	them	is	framed	in
terms	of	exclusive	identities,	justifying	the	resort	to	violence	and	mobilising	political	support.	Growing	inequality	–the
spread	of	poverty	and	marginalisation	and	the	loss	of	certainty	associated	with	migration	–	do	not	produce	these
exclusive	identities,	but		they	offer	vulnerable	recruiting	grounds.	Violence	is	a	mechanism	through	which	exclusive
identities	are	constructed;	if	you	are	threatened	because	of	your	identity,	you	turn	to	those	of	the	same	identity	for
protection.	Of	course	the	fit	is	never	exact	neither	in	the	modern	period	or	today		and	indeed	the	passion	associated
with	the	rise	of	identity	politics	may	foster	a	momentum	to	violence	that	is	at	odds	with	the	calculations	of	the
political	marketplace.	The	point	is	rather	to	understand	the	social	conditions	of	the	current	epoch	that	give	rise	to
the	kinds	of	identity	politics	typical	of	contemporary	war.
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